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[So F. No. 19346. In Bank.

Feb. 24, 1956.J

VICTOR BADILLO, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Respondent.
[1] Prohibition-Application of Bules - Crimin.aJ ProceedingsAccusatolT Pleading.-.A defendant is held to answer without
reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is based entirely on incompetent evidence, and in such a case the trial
court should grant a motion to set aside the information (Pen.
Code, § 995), and if it does not do so a peremptory writ of
prohibition will issue to prohibit further p~oceedings.
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside--GroundsEvidence megally Obtained.-Where evidence before the
magistrate bearing on the issue of illegality of a search or
seizure is in conilict or susceptible of eon1licting' inferences

[1] See Oal.Jur., Prohibition, § 21 j Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Prohil)ition, § 44; [2, 4] Indictment
and Information, § 88(6); [3,5,6] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [7]
Criminal Law, § 410. .
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or consists only of the testimony of prosecuting witnesses, the
trial court in ruling on a motion to set aside the information
will frequently not be in a position to make a final determination as to the admissibility of the evidence, and accordingly
the information should not be set aside on the ground that
the essential evidence was illegally obtained if there is any
substantial evidence or applicable presumption to support a
contrary conclusion, since in such cases the ultimate decision
on admissibility can be made at the trial on the basis of all
evidence bearing on the issue.
[3] Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that officers actf(d legally
in making a search or seizure.
[4] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds
-Evidence megally Obtained.-If the issue of legality of a
search or seizure is raised for the first time on a motion to
set aside the information, the motion should be denied unless
the evidence before the committing magistrate establishes that
efSsential evidence was illegally obtained.
[5] Searches and Seizures-Burden of Proof.-When the question
of the legality of an arrest or of a search or seizure is raised
either at the preliminary hearing or at the trial, defendant
makes a prima facie case when he establishes that an arrest
was made without a warrant or that private premises were
entered on a search made without a warrant, and the burden
then rests on the prosecution to show justification.
[6] ld.-Burden of Proof.-Where defendant makes a prima facie
showing of illegal entry by establishing that officers broke
into a house without a search warrant, the burden rests on the
prosecution to introduce evidence that the officers had reasonable cause to break and enter to make an arrest (See Pen.
Code § 844), and in the absence of such evidence it must be
taken as established for the purposes of a proceeding in prohibition to restrain further proceedings under an information
that the entry into the house was unlawful, it being immaterial
whether or not it was defendant's house.
[7] Criminal Law - Evidence - Evidence Obtained by Unlawful
Seizure.-Where defendant's flight out the front door of a
house and attempted disposal of a package of heroin towards
a federal narcotics agent was the direct result of an officer's
illegal entry, such evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees.
i3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
[7] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidenoe, § 393
et seq.
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from pro·
ceeding further in prosecution of a criminal case. Writ
granted.
MacInnis, Alaga & Glassman and Harry P. Glassman for
.Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By information petitioner was charged
with possessing heroin in violation of Health and Safety
Code, section 11500. His motion to set aside the information
on the ground that the evidence against him was obtained
by an illegal search and seizure was denied, and he now seeks
a writ of prohibition to prevent his trial.
Evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing of the
following facts: At approximately 6 p. m. on January 6,
1955, federal narcotics Agents Hipkins and Casey and Offi·
cers Getchell and McKinley of the San Francisco Police
Department went to a house on Sycamore Street in San Fran.
cisco. Agent Hipkins remained in front of the house, and the
three other officers went to the rear. Officer Getchell knoeked
at the back door, which was locked, and received no response.
He then forced the door open and entered the house followed
by Agent Casey. Shortly thereafter, petitioner, followed
closely by Officer Getchell, ran out the front door and threw
a package of heroin toward Agent Hipkins, who recovered
it. None of the officers had a search warrant.
[1] In Rogers v. Superior Court, ante, p. 3 [291 P.2d
929], we held that a "defendant has been held to answer
without reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is
based entirely on incompetent evidence," (ante, at p. 7)
and accordingly, in such a case the trial court shonId
grant a motion to set aside the information (Pen. Code,
§ 995), and if it does not do so, a peremptory writ of prohibi.
tion will issue to prohibit further proceedings. (Pen. Code,
§ 999a.) No problem is presented in applying this rule in
cases involving searches and eeizures in which the facts bear·
ing on the legality of the seareh or seizure are undisputed
and establish as a matter of law that the evidence is or is
not admissible. [2] In many cases, however, the evidence
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before the magistrate bearing on this issue may be in conflict
or susceptible of conflicting inferences or consist only of
the testimony of prosecution witnesses, and under these circumstances the court in ruling on a motion to set aside the
information will frequently not be in a position to make a
final determination as to the admissibility of the evidence.
Accordingly, the information should not be set aside on the
ground that essential evidence was illegally obtained if there
is any substantial evidence or applicable presumption to
support a contrary conclusion (see People v. Michael, 45
Ca1.2d 751, 753-754 [290 P.2d 852]; People v. Mariin, 45
Ca1.2d 755, 761-762 [290 P.2d 855)), and in such cases the
ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at the trial
on the basis of all of the evidence bearing on the issue. (See
People v. Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 780-781 [291 P.2d 469) ; People
v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459, 464 [282 P.2d 509].) [3,4] In the
9.bsence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
~fficers acted legally (see People v. Farrara, ante, p. 265
[294 P.2d 21)), and if the issue is raised for the first time
on a motion to set aside the information, the motion should
be denied unless the evidence before the committing magistrate establishes that essential evidence was illegally obtained.
[5] When, however, the question of the legality of an arrest
or of a search and seizure is raised either at the preliminary
hearing or at the trial, the defendant makes a prima facie
case when he establishes that an arrest was made without a
warrant or that private premises were entered or a search
made without a search warrant, and the burden then rests
on the prosecution to show proper justification. (Dragna v.
White, 45 Ca1.2d 469, 471-472 [289 P.2d 428] ; Coverstone v.
Davies, 38 Ca1.2d 315, 319 [239 P.2d 876) ; Hughes v. Ore"b,
36 Ca1.2d 854, 858 [228 P.2d 550); People v. Boyles, 45
Ca1.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2d 535) ; People v. Gorg, S'Upra, 45 Cal.
2d 776,782-783.)
[6] In the present case defendant made a prima faciE:'
showing of illegal entry by establishing that the officers broke
into the house without a search warrant, and the burden
then rested on the prosecution to introduce evidence that
the officers had reasonable cause to break and enter to make
an arrest. (See Pen. Code, § 844.) Since no such evidence
was presented, it must be taken a<l established for the purposes
of this proceeding that the entry into the house was unlawful,·
• Although the preliminary heariDg in this ease was held before the
decision in People v. Ca1Ian, .. Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.lld 1105], defendant
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and it is immaterial whether or not it was defendant'8 house.
(People v. Martin, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 760-761.)
[7] The attorney general contends that defendant abandoned the evidence when he threw it toward Agent Hipkins
and that therefore he may not object to its use against him.
It elearly appears, however, that defendant's 1iight out the
front door and attempted disposal of the evidence was the
direct result of Officer Getchell's illegal entry, and accordingly, the evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional
guarantees. (Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385,392 [40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426] ; People
v. Berger, 44 Ca1.2d 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509]; People v.
Stewart, 232 Mich. 670 [206 N.W. 337, 338].)
Let the peremptory writ. of prohibition issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment and generally in
the reasoning in the majority opinion but I wish to point out
that under a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States (Dantan George Rca v. United States of America, January 16, 1956, 350 U.S. 214 [76 8. Ct. 292, 100 L.
Ed. --]) it would seem that evidence illegally obtained by
federal agents would not be admissible in a state court notwithstanding the rule announced by this court in People. v.
Cahan,44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
Petitioner was charged with the possession of heroin in
violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code.
Possession of narcotics is in the nature of a eontinuing offense.
and the evidence shows that petitioner had committed and
was committing the offense at the time of the arrest and
search. I am therefore. of the opinion that this ease presents
two material questions: (1) whether the arrest without a
antieipated a pos8ible change in the law, and the magistrate permitted
him to establish that the entry was made without a search warrant. Presumably in reliance on the nonexclusionary rule, the prosecution made
no attempt to prove that the officers had reasonable cauee to enter the
l!ouse to make an arrest. Since defendant has not been in jeopardy
(1"
HarrOf&, 191 Cal. 457,466 [217 P. 728]; see P,opl, v. Godl'tDski,
22 Cal.2d 677, 681-682 [140 P.2d 381]; Pen. Code, •• 999,1021), there is
nothing to prevent the prosecution from instituting a new proceeding
and proving, if it ean, that the offieers had reasonable cause to enter
the premises to make an arrest.
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warrant was a lawful arrest; and (2) if so, whether the search
was reasonable as an incident to such lawful arrest.
Heretofore this court has deemed it unnecessary to determine whether an arrest without a warrant under the
circumstances presented here is a lawful arrest under subdivision 2 of section 836 of the Penal Code. It was so
declared in People v. Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640, at page 643
[290 P.2d 528], where it was held that "the legality of
an arrest is not necessarily determinative of the lawfulness
of a search incident thereto."
This court further said:
"Moreover, whether or not the arrest of a guilty defendant
is lawful, it is clearly unreasonable if the officer has no
'reasonable cause' to believe the defendant guilty, and a
search incident thereto can be no more reasonable than the
arrest itself." (P. 644.) Thus it appears that this court
has made a distinction between a lawful arrest and a
reasonable arrest. I had doubt concerning the validity of
any such distinction, and it was for this reason that I voteil
for a rehearing in People v. Brown, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 640,
and People v. Simon, 45 Ca1.2d 645 [290 P.2d 531]. I have
concluded that the question of the lawfulness of the arrest is a
material one in the determination of the present case and
of other pending eases, and that it should be decided here.
Section 836 of the Penal Code provides: "A peaceofficer may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person:
"1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his
presence.
"2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
"3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have
committed it.
"4. On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.
"5. At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe
that he has committed a felony."
In my opinion, the arrest without a warrant in the
present case was lawful under the above-quoted subdivision 2.
An analysis of section 836 shows that there is a marked difference between the provisions of subdivision 2 and those of
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5. The three last-mentioned subdivisions
specify the circumstances under which "reasonable cause"
is required in order to make lawful an arrest without a warrant, but subdivision 2 makes no mention of "reasonable
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cause" and maltes lawful an arrest without a warrant "when
a person arrested has committed a felony."
In determining the lawfulness of an arrest, all subdivisions
of section 836 must be considered together, and subdivision 2
must be given its obvious meaning. If we depart from the
clear language of that subdivision by engrafting thereon an
additional requirement of "reasonable cause," we do violence
to the terms of the subdivision and also render it meaningless and purposeless. The remaining subdivisions cover those
lawful arrests which require "reasonable cause" and cover
every arrest which might be made under subdivision 2 if an
arrest under subdivision 2 is held to be conditioned upon an
unexpressed requirement of "reasonable cause." We cannot
assume that the Legislature intended to enact a purposeless
provision when it included subdivision 2 in that section, but
that conclusion is inevitable if we fail to give effect to its
plain and unambiguous terms. I therefore conclude that an
arrest without a warrant is a lawful arrest if the person arrested has committed a felony, regardless of whether the
arresting officer acted upon such prior knowledge as might
be deemed to constitute "reasonable cause." Of course the
arresting officer acts at his peril (Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Ca1.2d
854 [228 P.2d 550] j Coyne v. Nelson, 107 Cal.App.2d 469
[237 P.2d 45]), but there appears to be no sound reason for
holding the arrest unlawful if the person arrested has in
fact committed a felony. It further appears that the officer
making such lawful arrest may do so by using such means as
are sanctioned by section 844 of the Penal Code. (People v.
Martin,45 Ca1.2d 755 [290 P.2d 855].)
The question remains as to whether the search and seirore
here made was reasonable as an incident of a lawful arrest.
Since the adoption of the exclusionary rule, which declares
inadmissible any evidence obtained through "unreasonable
searches and seizures" (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282
P.2d 905] ; People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 509] ;
People v. Tarantino, 45 Ca1.2d 590 [290 P.2d 505]), this
court has been considering a series of cases presenting the
question of whether searches under varying circumstances were
reasonable or unreasonable. In deciding these cases, this
court has been endeavoring to establish "workable rules
governing searches and seizures" and is committed to the
avoidance of "needless refinements and distinctions" and
"needless limitations on the right to conduct reasonable
searches and seizures." (People v. Cahan, IVpra, pp. 450-

)

276

BADlLLO

v.

SUPERIOR COURT

[46 C.2d

451.) The unfinished task of establishing such rules is of
the utmost importance, not only by reason of the relation of
such rules to the application of the exclusionary rule but also
because of their relation to actions which may be brought
against law enforcement officers, seeking to impose criminal
and civil sanctions upon them for the making of searches
which may be claimed to be unreasonable.
The inherent difficulty of establishing logical, workable.
and understandable rules to supplement the exclusionary rule
has been generally recognized. It seems clear, however, that
in establishing these rules, we should endeavor to balance
the interests of the individual with the interests of society;
that we should not unduly hamper the legitimate efforts of
those who are charged with the solution of the perplexing
problems of law enforcement j and that we should not unnecessarily open unduly wide the avenues of escape for those
who apparently have no regard for our laws except insofar
as those laws may appear to provide a shield to protect them
in their illegal operations. To this end we should not hold
unreasonable those searches which may properly be held
to be reasonable, and we should strive to formulate logical
rules which will establish a consistent pattern to guide our
law enforcement officers.
This court has already properly determined that a lawful
arrest, accompanied by a search and seizure incident to such
arrest, does not violate constitutional guarantees under certain
circumstances regardless of the fact that no warrant of arrest
or search warrant Dlay have previously issued. (People v.
Boyles, 45 Ca1.2d 652 [290 P.2d 535] j People v. Marlin,
supra, 45 Ca1.2d 755.) As above indicated, however, this
court has held that the reasonableness of the search incident
to the arrest depends not only upon the lawfulness of the
arrest, but also upon the reasonableness of the arrest. It is
with this conclusion that I cannot agree, for if an arrest is
lawful it does not appear appropriate to declare that such
lawful arrest is unreasonable.
As was said in State v. Williams, 328 Mo. 627 [14 S.W.2d
434], at page 436 [14 S.W.2d], in affirming a judgment of
conviction based upon evidence obtained through a search
incident to an arrest without a warrant: "As applicable to
this case it would not matter a particle, when the deputy
sheriff made the arrest, whether reasonable ground to believe
a felony had been committed was presented to his mind or not;
he is justified because the reasonable ground existed; the
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crime had in fact been committed. That is a complete justification. The arrest was therefore lawful."
If we are to formulate logical rules which will establish
a consistent pattern, it appears to be illogical to hold reasonable the searches made as incidents of lawful arrests in some
of the decided eases, and at the same time to hold unreasonable the search made as an incident of a lawful arrest in the
present ease, as well as the searches made as incidents of
lawful arrests in the Brown and Simon eases. The adoption
of the rules laid down by the majority opinion here and in
the cited eases means that a search made as an incident of
an arrest declared lawful by subdivisions 3, 4 or 5 of section
836, is reasonable, regardless of whether the person arrested
has or has not committed a felony, provided that the arresting officer acts upon prior knowledge which may be subsequently held to fall within the nebulous realm of "reasonable cause," but that a search made as an incident of an
arrest declared lawful by subdivision 2 of section 836 is
unreasonable, regardless of the fact that the person arrested
has actually committed a felony, unless the arresting officer
acts upon prior knowledge which may be subsequently held
to fall within that nebulous realm. In my opinion, rules
which bring about this undesirable result are illogical, and
they fail to establish any consistent pattern. The difficulty
can be avoided if one logical, workable, and understandable
rule is applied to all cases by holding that if the arrest is
lawful, then the search made as an incident of the lawful
arrest is a reasonable search, rather than an "unreasonable"
search.
While it is recognized that the guilty as well as the innocent are entitled to the benefit of the constitutional guarantee
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" (People v.
CaJtan, supra; People v. Berger, supra; People v. Tarantino, supra), the cited cases did not present any question
of the reasonableness of a search made as an incident of a lawful arrest. The claimed "unreasonable searches" or other invasions of the defendants' rights in those eases were made
over a long period of time and without any direct connection
with any arrest. Here the search was made as an incident
of a lawful arrest, in the sense that it was made at the time
and place of such lawful arrest; and in my opinion, it should
be held to be reasonable under these circumstances.
By way of summary, I am of the opinion that the arrest
in the present case was a lawful arrest under subdivision
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2 of section 8S6 of the Penal. Code, as it appears that the
petitioner Badillo had committed and was committing a
felony at the time of his arrest; that the search was an incident of his lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable, and
not in violation of the constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures"; that the evidence obtained
by such search was therefore properly admitted upon the
preliminary hearing; and that petitioner's motion to set aside
the information upon the ground that the evidence was obtained by an alleged "unreasonable" search and seizure was
properly denied by the trial court.
I would therefore discharge the alternative writ of prohibition and deny the peremptOry writ.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was c1f'nied Marc1:J 21.
1956. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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